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INTRODUCTION
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),' enacted in 1996 as part of the
Newt Gingrich "Contract with America," 2 is now as old as some prisoners. In the
year after the statute's passage, some commenters labeled it merely "symbolic." 3 In
fact, as was evident nearly immediately, the PLRA undermined prisoners' ability to
bring, settle, and win lawsuits. 4 The PLRA conditioned court access on prisoners'
C 2015 by Margo Schlanger. This Article may be copied and distributed for free or at cost to students
or prisoners.
* Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Thanks to Grady Bridges for data
management assistance and, as always, to Sam Bagenstos for his helpful comments. I wish to
acknowledge the generous support of the William W. Cook Endowment of the University of
Michigan.
1. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. 8, § 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-
66 to -77 (1996) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 523 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 3624, 3626 (2012); 28
U.S.C. § 1346, 1915, 1915A, 1932 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1997a-c, e-f, h (2012)). The PLRA was part
of the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321.
2. NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 53 (Ed Gillespie & Bob
Schellhas eds., 1994) (referring to the PLRA's predecessor bill, the Taking Back Our Streets Act, H.R.
3, 104th Cong. (1995)).
3. Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Lays: The Pathologies of the
Antiterrorsm and Effective Death Penal/ Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1 (1997).
4. For in-depth examination of the PLRA's impact on damage actions, see Margo Schlanger,
Inmate Litgation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003) [hereinafter Schlanger, Inmate Iigation]. For i-depth
examination of the PLRA's impact on injunctive litigation, see Margo Schlanger, Ciil Rights Ijunctions
Over Time: A Case Stud of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006) [hereinafter
Schlanger, Ciil Rights Ijunctions]. Note that the subsequent description of the PLRA in this paragraph
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meticulously correct prior use of onerous and error-inviting prison grievance
procedures.5 It increased filing fees,6 decreased attorneys' fees, 7 and limited
damages. 8 It subjected injunctive settlements to the scope limitations usually
applicable only to litigated injunctions.9 It made prison and jail population caps-
previously common-far more difficult to obtain.10 And it put in place a rule
inviting frequent relitigation of injunctive remedies, whether settled or litigated. 11
The resulting impact on jail and prison litigation has been extremely
substantial. In two articles about a decade ago, I presented descriptive statistics
showing the PLRA-caused decline in civil rights filings and plaintiffs' victories,1
2
and the likewise declining prevalence of court-ordered regulation of jails and
prisons.13 More up-to-date information has not been published, so here I update
those statistics for use by policymakers, judges, and other researchers, and discuss
them briefly. I look in Parts I through III at damage actions, using primarily the
also appears m my article, Hox Prsoners' Rights Lazyers Are Preserving the Role of the Courts, 69 U. MIAMI
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
5. 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) ("No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."); see also
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006). A good deal has been written about this provision. See, e.g.,
Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, Preseving the Rule of Lax in America's Jails and Prisons: The Case for
Amendcng the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 139 (2008); see also, e.g., Alison M.
Mikkor, Correcting for Bias and Blind Spots in PLRA Ex hastion LaW, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 573
(2014); Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the PRison Ltigation Reform Act: The Consequence of
Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771 (2003); Giovanna Shay, Exhausted, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 287
(2012); Eugene Novikov, Comment, Stacking the Deck: Futility and the Exhaustion Provision of the Pson
Litigation Reform Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 817 (2008).
6. 28 U.S.C. 1915(b) (excluding prisoners from the ordinary in forma pauperis ability to file
without payment of fees); see also id. 1914(a) (setting the fee for a district court civil action at $350).
7. 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(3) (capping defendants' liability for attorneys' fees in civil rights cases
at 150% of the rate paid publicly appointed defense counsel). In addition, the PLRA has been read to
further cap defendants' liability for attorneys' fees in monetary civil rights cases at 150% of the
judgment. Id. 1997e(d)(2); see, e.g., Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc)
(reversing the district court and disagreeing with appellate panel, holding that this limitation applies
even to fees awarded even for a lawsuit involving a preincarceration claim).
8. 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e) ("No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a
jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury . "); see, e.g., Hilary Detmold, Note, 'Tis Enough, 'Tnill
Serve: Defining Physical Ijug Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1111 (2013).
9. 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1)(A) (2012) ("Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to
prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right
of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless
the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right.").
10. 18 U.S.C. > 3626(a)(3) (setting out procedural and substantive hurdles to obtaining a
"prisoner release order"); see also Plata v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (affirming imposition of such
an order in California).
11. 18 U.S.C. 3626(b) (allowing defendants in prison conditions cases to periodically seek
"termination" of previously entered injunctions).
12. See, e.g., Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 4, at 1583-87, 1660-64.
13. See, e.g., Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions, supra note 4, at 576-89.
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data compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (the AO) for each
federal district court case "terminated" (that is, marked complete by a district
court, whether provisionally-say, pending appeal-or finally). These data are
discussed in this Article's Technical Appendix, which follows the main text;
replication code is also posted online. 14 Part I examines prisoner filings over time
and by state. Part II examines outcomes over time and compares outcomes in
other case categories. And Part III looks at litigated damages. (Because the AO's
data on damages are error-ridden,'5 Part III supplements the AO database with
docket-based research into individual cases.) All three Parts uncover a number of
topics that are ripe for additional research.
In Part IV, I move to the topic of injunctive prison and jail litigation-cases
in which prisoner plaintiffs seek a change in policy or other aspects of prison
conditions. The PLRA was motivated in large part by Republican discontent with
plaintiffs' successes in such litigation, 16  and Part IV demonstrates more
comprehensively than prior data that it has succeeded in radically shrinking-but
not eliminating-the coverage of such orders.
I. FILINGS
The PLRA's sharp impact on the prevalence and outcomes in prison
litigation is clear. Begin with filings. These are affected by numerous PLRA
provisions, including: the rule that filing fees are unwaivable for indigent
prisoners;'7 the requirement of administrative exhaustion 18 (which discourages
lawsuits where such exhaustion has not occurred, since they will almost certainly
fail); the attorneys' fees limits;19 and the three-strikes requirement compelling
frequent lawsuit filers to satisfy filing fees in advance without regard to their ability
to pay.20 As before the PLRA, litigation remains one of the few avenues for
prisoners to seek redress for adverse conditions or other affronts to their rights.
Accordingly, litigation continues-but at a much reduced rate. Table 1
14. See Margo Schlanger, Data Appen2x. Trends in Prisoner Litigation, As the PLRA Enters
Adulthood, UC. Ivine Lax Reien) (2015), https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/margoschlanger/
Pages /Trends.aspx.
15. See Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliabiliy of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Cours Database: An Initial EmpiricalAnalysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1455 (2003).
16. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S14,418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch m
support of S. 1279) ("While prison conditions that actually violate the Constitution should not be
allowed to persist, I believe that the courts have gone too far m micromanagmg our Nation's
prisons.").
17. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(b) (2012).
18. See 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (2012).
19. See id. 1997e(e).
20. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) ("In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section [that is, in forma pauperis] if the prisoner
has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or
appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,
or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent
danger of serious physical injury.").
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demonstrates. It shows jail and prison populations from 1970 to the present, along
with federal court filings categorized by the courts as dealing with "prisoner civil
rights" or "prison conditions."2' Figures A and B present some of the same
information in graphic form-Figure A shows filings compared to prison and jail
population, and Figure B shows filing rates compared to prison and jail population.
The national trends in Table 1 and Figures A and B are clear. A steep
increase in prisoner civil rights litigation combined in the 1970s with a steep
increase in incarcerated population. The filing rate slowly declined in the 1980s,
but the increase in jail and prison population nonetheless pushed up raw filings.
Then, as in the 1970s, the 1990s saw an increase in both jail and prison population
and filings rates, until 1995. In 1996, the PLRA immediately transformed the
litigation landscape. After a very steep decline in both filings and filing rates in
1996 and 1997, rates continued to shrink for another decade (although the
increasing incarcerated population meant that the resulting number of filings
increased a bit). Since 2007, filing rates, prison population, and filings have all
plateaued.
21. Litigation figures are calculated using data released annually by the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts, available in digital form from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and
Social Research at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/00072/studies. Prisoner
population figures come from a variety of publications by the Bureau of justice Statistics, a
component of the U.S. Department of justice. Sources are set out comprehensively in the Technical
Appendix that follows this Article.
[Vol. 5:153
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Table 1: Prison and Jail Population and Prisoner Civil Rights Filings
in Federal District Court, Fiscal Years 1970-201222
Prisoner Civil Rights FilingsIncarcerated Population in Federal District Court
Fiscal Non- Filings
Year of State Fed. Fed. Fed. per 1000




















































































































































































































Estimates (jail population is unavailable for these years).
22. See ifra Technical App. at A, C-E.
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23. See ixfri Technical App- at A, C-E. Jail population is estunated for 1971-1977, 1979.
24. Se ofi Technical App, at A, C-E, Jail population is estimated for 1971-1977, 1979,
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The state-by-state story is far more varied. Table 2 presents the data: it
compares 1995 (the year prior to the PLRA) and 2011 (the latest year for which
state-by-state jail information-and therefore filing rate infonnation is available).
The first set of columns show the jail and prison population, 25 the prisoner civil
rights filings in federal district court, and the resulting filing rate in 1995. The
states are set out in rank order, with Iowa, the state whose prisoners were in 1995
the most litigious, ranked 1. The second set of columns presents the same
information for 2011. The third set of columns shows the change over the sixteen
year period, as a simple change and as a percent change-so Iowa's change from a
filing rate of 101.7 to 14.5 federal lawsuits per 1000 prisoners is shown both as a
change of 87.2 (101.7 - 14.5), and 85.7%. Nationwide the filing rate shrank by
14.1 filings per 1000 prisoners, and by nearly 60%, from 24.6 to 10.5 lawsuits per
1000 prisoners. For thirty states, the proportional change was that big or bigger,
and for most of the rest, nearly as big. But as Table 2 presents, for a few states the
change was far smaller. California, in fact, has seen almost no change in its filing
rate-although it is alone in that experience. Figure C puts the penultimate
columns of Table 2 into a histogram, to make plainer the varied experience of the
states.
Figures D and E focus additional attention on the varying effects of the
PLRA by state. Figure D presents the six states that have experienced the steepest
decline in filing rates since 1995, showing their changed filing rates by year. (So for
example, a drop of 10 filings per 1000 inmates from the rate in 1995 whatever
that rate was-is shown as -10.) Figure E is the same information for the six states
that have experienced the shallowest decline.
Figure D's states look very like the nation as a whole, although the pattern is
more pronounced. But Figure E's patterns are quite different. While the trend
lines are not entirely consistent state to state, they generally are U-shaped curves.
That is, even in these least-affected states, filing rates declined for some years after
the PLRA's passage. At that point, something-I imagine something different in
each state-turned that trend around and caused the filing rate to increase. Future
research might uncover what that spur was. We can guess that it was not appellate
precedent; the states in question are from the First, Second, Third, Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits-no circuit has more than one state represented in the
bottom six.
25. Because state-by-state jail population is not available from 1994 to 1999, the jail
population is calculated using a linear interpolation between the 1993 and 2000 figures.
2015]
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Table 2: Change in Prisoner Filings in U.S. District Court and
Filing Rates by State, Fiscal Years 1995-201226
1995 2012 1995-2012
Jail and Jail and
Prison Filing Rate Prison Filing Rate Rate Change Rank
State Pop. Filings Rate Rank Pop. Filings Rate Rank N % Changt





















































16,273 1,035 63 6
4,733 297 628
25,883 1,523 58 8
41,047 2,166 528
31,639 1,403 44 3
4,799 205 427
38,106 1,548 40 6
11,898 475 39 9
32,628 1,247 38 2
2,329 87 374
22,084 824 37 3
26,922 967 35 9
30,799 1,076 34 9
63,720 2,114 332
20,278 634 31 3
1,913 57 29 8
2,575 76 29 5
1,245 35 28 1
2,812 76 270
12,373 333 26 9
21,275 559 26 3
6,633 169 25 5
6,855 169 24 7
26,927 648 241
20,185 481 23 8
15,740 370 23 5
64,977 1,496 23 0
56,827 1,270 22 3
32,295 708 21 9
56,049 1,217 21 7
21,686 437 202
39,360 760 19 3
2,854 54 18 9
194,719 3,597 18 5
103,799 1,860 17 9
110,948 1,968 17 7
3,239 57 17 6
2,876 50 174
14,327 227 15 8
8,022 124 15 5
4,978 75 15 1
42,701 639 150
3,244 47 14 5
57,732 746 129
218,145 2,575 11 8
11,515 124 10 8
19,067 153 80
1.112 8 72
26. See ifra Technical App. at A, C-E.
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12,999 162 12 5
25,405 651 25 6
34,535 433 12 5
8,163 83 102
44,746 393 8 8
64,825 673 10 4
43,926 690 15 7
6,730 154 22 9
57,189 660 11 5
19,516 289 14 8
59,559 598 10 0
3,276 34 104
41,149 228 5 5
48,616 371 7 6
49,516 571 11 5
101,938 1,281 126
36,746 353 9 6
3,723 18 48
5,067 93 184
2,034 20 9 8
5,993 81 13 5
18,850 136 72
36,511 296 8 1
12,597 93 74
20,219 142 70
40,679 621 15 3
29,729 375 12 6
18,497 154 8 3
108,644 996 9 2
75,886 1,447 19 1
35,499 393 11 1
62,226 794 128
38,689 180 4 7
62,960 530 8 4
3,042 30 9 9





23,853 187 7 8
16,219 93 5 7
11,443 107 94
45,473 504 111
4,711 36 7 6
73,687 248 3 4
231,515 2,592 11 2
20,198 97 48
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Figure C: Percent Decline in Prisoner Filing Rate in U.S. District Court,
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Figure D: Decline in Prisoner Filing Rate in U.S. District Court,
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Figure E: Decline in Prisoner Filing Rate in U.S. District Court,
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IL. OUTCOMES
One might expect that the drastic pruning of the prisoner civil rights docket
that occurred beginning in 1996 would tilt the docket toward higher quality
cases-so that prisoner success rates would go up. However, I previously
demonstrated, using data through 2001, that the PLRA not only made prisoner
civil rights cases harder to bring, as illustrated above, but also made them harder
to win.3° In particular, prisoners' cases are thrown out of court for failure to
properly complete often-complicated grievance procedures, 31 or because they do
not allege physical injury, which some courts read the PLRA to require for
recovery even in constitutional cases.32 Now that we have another decade of data,
it's worth reexamining this issue, to see if trends have continued, moderated, or
reversed.
New data, presented in Table 3, confirm my earlier conchlsions. The table
presents outcomes in prisoners' federal civil rights cases, resolved from Fiscal
Year 1988 through 2012, the last year for which data are available. (1988 is chosen
as a start date because of federal coding protocol changes prior to that year.) Each
row is a year, each coluni a particular outcome. Scanning the table one column at
a time, to detect trends over time, reveals that the courts are becoming less and
less hospitable for prisoners' claims. Column (a) shows filings; column (b)
terminations; and column (c) the portion of those terminations that constituted
29, S infi Technical App. at A, C-E_
30. See Schlanger, Inate Itian, apm note 4, at 1644-64.
31. See sipm note 5 and accompanying text-
32 See spra note 8
[Vol. 5:153
TRENDS IN PRISONER LITIGATION
judgments. (Most non-judgments are transfers to another court.) Most remaining
outcomes are calculated as a proportion of judgment dispositions. Column (d) is
pretrial decisions for the defendant; tracing it through the years shows that after
the PLRA, such decisions increased although not overwhelmingly so. On the
other side, pretrial victories for the plaintiff, in column (e), have declined, though
some of that decline predates the PLRA.33 Column (f) shows a decline in
settlements, much but not all postdating the PLRA. Column (g) shows a similar
decline in voluntary dismissals, which are often settlements as well. And column
(h) shows a decline in trials, again much of it subsequent to the PLRA. (Plaintiffs'
victories at those decreasing numbers of trials, in column (i), appear not to have
changed.) Columns (j) and (k) show the timing of settlements, before or after
"issue is joined," (that is, before or after the filing of an answer to the civil
complaint). The declining portion of settlements in column (j) suggests that
settlements have become harder to come by for plaintiffs. And finally, column (1)
sums up the portion of the docket in which it appears plaintiffs may have
succeeded in any way, adding together settlements, voluntary dismissals, pretrial
victories, and victories at trial. Those numbers are down substantially since the
early 1990s.
In short, in cases brought by prisoners, the government defendants are
winning more cases pretrial, settling fewer matters, and going to trial less often.
Those settlements that do occur are harder fought; they are finalized later in the
litigation process. Plaintiffs are, correspondingly, winning and settling less often,
and losing outright more often. Probably not all these changes were caused by the
PLRA-several of the trend lines seem to start prior to the statute's enactment.
But given the PLRA's very definite anti-plaintiff tilt, it seems nearly certain tat
the statute has caused at least some of the declining access to court remedies
demonstrated in Table 3.
33. This variable is sufficiently error ridden, at least m the prisoner litigation data, to counsel
against reliance on it. See ifra text accompanying Table 7 (discussing high error rates).
2015]
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Table 3: Outcomes in Prisoner Civil Rights Cases in
Federal District Court, Fiscal Years 1988-201234
[Vol. 5:153
Outcomes, Timing of








ments, Pretrial Pretrial Trial esses,
as % of Decis- Decis- Vol. Vict., Before After as % of
Fiscal Termi- Termi- ions for ions for Sett- Dism- as % of Issue Issue Judg-
Year Filings nations nations Deft. Plaint. led issals Trials Trials Joined Joined ments
1988 22,642 24,077 965% 83 2o 1 1% 7 1% 40o 3 6% 13 6% 585% 41 5% 126%
1989 23,737 24,714 96 5% 82 1 10% 73o 51% 37o 14 0o 52 3o 47 7o 13 9o
1990 24,051 24,864 96 0o 82 7o 11% 76% 5Wo 34% 16 6% 48 8o 512% 14 3o
1991 24,352 24,877 95 0o 82 1 09o 77o 61/ 31 15 2% 52 1 47 9o 15 2%
1992 28,544 28,357 94 9o 80 2% 12% 76% 75% 33o 12 1 60 2% 39 8o 16 8o
1993 31,693 31,893 95 1- 81 2: 10 68 80 28- 15 3- 600o 400o 16 2-
1994 36,595 36,098 94 9 8019 08o 72o 72o 29o 131o 538o 462% 15 6o
1995 39,053 41,201 948o 835 07o 62 65o 25o 107 613o 38 7 13 7
I199 86 42,522 ' I 950 845 06 I 3 I3 25o I5 Glp 127,oII
1997 26,095 34,982 96 0o 83 8o 07o 54o 68o 28o 10 7o 61 2% 38 8o 13 2o
1998 24,212 29,938 9509 8552 O5 52o 60o 25o 86o 607o 393o 120o
1999 23,512 26,561 947o 865o 05% 47o 52o 24% 121% 567o 43 3 107o
2000 23,357 25,176 937- 86 3 04/ 42- 57- 24- 13 6- 54 0 46 0 10 7-
2001 22,131 24,572 93 9o 87 0o 04% 39o 57% 21 14 0o 53 9o 46 1/ 10 3o
2002 21,988 24,245 93 9o 87 9o 04% 36% 56% 18% 88o 55 2% 44 8o 98%
2003 22,061 23,653 93 6% 88 0o 06% 38o 5/ 14% 14 1o 53 2% 46 8o 97o
2004 21,553 23,181 92 8o 86 0o 04% 38o 48o 14% 13 2% 55 4% 44 6% 92%
2005 22,484 23,712 92 5% 85 0o 03o 38o 44% 12% 10 Wo 53 4% 46 6% 87o
2006 22,469 24,846 93 6% 83 2% 03o 39o 40o 12% 12 9o 54 3o 45 7o 84%
2007 21,978 23,630 92 5% 82 0o 02% 38o 47o 13% 94% 56 7o 43 3o 89o
2008 23,555 25,097 92 2% 85 3o 05% 37o 46% 12% 15 V/ 53 2% 46 8o 90o
2009 22,698 24,454 91 9o 87 0o 05% 42% 53o 13% 13 1o 512% 48 8o 10 2%
2010 22,736 24,781 91 3o 85 9o 05% 48o 52% 13% 14 4% 47 6% 52 4% 10 7o
2011 23,362 24,760 90 4% 85 8o 04% 49o 54% 12% 116% 49 5% 50 5% 11 Wo
2012 22,662 24,673 90 9o 84 9o 05% 5 o 54% 13% 11o 1 50 6% 49 4% 111 V
Table 4 next provides some context for the very limited success prisoner
plaintiffs experience, setting out the same outcome information but for other
categories of cases, all in Fiscal Year 2012. As it shows, only in the other prisoner
category-habeas cases and other similar quasi-criminal matters-do plaintiffs
fare anywhere close to as badly.
34. See zfra Technical App. at A.
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Table 4: Outcomes in Federal District Court Cases
by Case Type, Fiscal Year 201235
Outcomes, Timing of









ments, Pretrial Pretrial Trial esses,
as % of Decis- Decis- Vol. Vict., as Before After as % of
Termi- Termi- ions for ions for Dism- % of Issue Issue Judg-
Filings nations nations Deft. Plaint. Settled issals Trials Trials Joined Joined ments
Al 278,442 271,572 879% 41 7% 68% 326% 145% 11%1 43 4% 42 2% 5781 54 4/
Habeas,
Quasi 26,241 27,245 89 90
Crim.
90 2" 210 220 230 040 35 90 77 00 2300 1 67"
3,778 2,934 86 80
1,742 1,821 92 90/
19,707 20,661 92 30/
49,846 48,888 84 40/
5,714 5,253 79 00/
16,261 16,984 9280/
18,051 19,580 85 60/
14,055 14,609 89 90/
23,859 26,358 8800/
22,942 43,914 83 60/
























213% 78 7l 66 20/
60 2% 39 80/
29 0% 71 00/
59 6% 40 40/
37 0% 63 001 80 3/
Prisoner plaintiffs not only lose more often than other plaintiffs-they lose
faster. Table 5 sets out the time to disposition for cases filed in district courts,
Fiscal Year 1988 to 2011, the last year with full data available.
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Table 5: Days to Disposition: District Court Cases by Fiscal Year of Filing 36
Prisoner "Other" All Cases Except
Civil Rights Cases Civil Rights Cases Prisoner Civil Rights
Fiscal 25% of 50% of 25% of 50% of 25% of 50% of







































































































































































Table 6 provides one piece of the explanation, setting out the proportion of
cases by type of suit, litigated by plaintiffs without counsel. It shows that prisoner
civil rights cases, as one would expect, are overwhelmingly pro se-and at a much
higher rate than prior to the PLRA, which drastically limited attorneys' fees. 37
36. See izfra Technical App. at A.
37. The table begins with 1996 because that is the first year for which data are available, but
the prisoner cases terminated in 1996 were overwhelmingly (eighty-six percent) filed prior to the
enactment of the PLRA.
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Table 6: Pro Se Litigation in U.S. District Courts,
Cases Terminated Selected Fiscal Years
38
Case Category 1996 2000 2006 2012
Contract 2.5% 2.6% 3.7% 4.4%
Torts (Nonproduct) 5.4% 6.0% 8.7% 12.6%
Product Liability 0.8% 1.5% 1.5% 1.1%
Civil Rights 29.8-6 30.1% 32.7% 34.6%
Civil Rights Employment 16.30' 20.3% 19.2% 19.8%
PIsoJer iviJlghs 83.3111 95.6% 965%9-9
Labor and Employment 2.900 3.80 3.0o 2.900
Statutory Actions 6.0% 6.5% 6.4% 8.2%
U.S. Plaintiff 3.4% 1.3% 4.6% 13.2%
Habeas, Other Quasi 72.2% 84.5% 85.1% 88.8%
Criminal
Bankruptcy 12.8% 18.2% 19.0% 20.5%
Immigration 8.6% 29.9% 18.9% 35.4%
Other 11.8% 19.7% 13.6% 14.5%
Total 26.9% 26.2% 25.0% 26.1%
Total Without Prisoner
or Habeas Cases 7.8% 8.6% 8.2% 10.5%
III. DAMAGES
As the last aspect of my examination of prisoner damage actions, I look at
the damages themselves. I previously conducted a study of cases terminated in
1993, and found that (after excluding one very large outlying award) the average
damages in cases with trial judgments for prisoner plaintiffs were about $18,800,
with a median of a mere $1000. 39 I decided to repeat this study, to see what might
have changed in the two decades since. To do tis, I examined-using the docket
sheet and other court documents-each case coded by the court system as ending
with a trial or other litigated judgment in Fiscal Year 2012, the latest data available.
The AO's coding is somewhat imprecise, particularly for the non-trials. Of those
cases that met these initial selection criteria, most turned out to be defendants'
victories, and others turned out to be settlements: I excluded both. Table 6
presents the results. As it shows, case results for 2012 are entirely consonant with
the 1993 study. Of fifty-eight litigated judgments, the mean award was under
$22,000 for trials and under $19,000 for non-trials, with a median of just $1525 for
38. See izfra Technical App. at A.
39. See Schlanger, Inmate tzgatzion, supra note 4, at 1603.
UC IRTVINE LAW REVIEW
trials and $7000 for non-trials. Across all the cases, nationwide litigated damages
totaled a mere $1,000,000.
Table 7: Prisoner Civil Rights Litigated Victories,
Fiscal Year 2012 (Excludes Setlements)
40
Trials Non-trials All
Plaintiffs Wins 36 21 57
Injunctive Matters 4 3 7
<= $1,000 15 3 18
$1,001-13,000 8 12 20
25,000-80,000 7 2 9
$100,000+ 2 1 3
Total Damages Awarded $700,908 $339,862 $1,040,770
Cases with Damages 32 18 50
Average Damages per Case $21,903 $18,881 $20,815
Median Damages per Case $ 1,525 $7,000 $4,185
Thus when prisoners do litigate all the way to victory, they tend to win pretty
small.
IV. COURT ORDERS
Since the 1970s, court orders have been a major source of regulation and
oversight for American jails and prisons whether those orders entailed active
judicial supervision, intense involvement of plaintiffs' counsel or other monitors,
or simply a court-enforceable set of constraints on corrections officials'
discretion. 41 The PLRA altered this system with provisions that promote
termination of existing court orders, and others that shortened the life span of
new orders.42 The impact took some time to manifest, but is now very clear. Table
7 shows the results.43
40. See ufra Technical App. at A-B.
41. See Schlanger, Civil Rghts Injunctions, supra note 4, at 552.
42. See supra notes 10-11.
43. Table 7 is based on data reported by jail and prison officials m the censuses conducted by
the Bureau of Justice Statistics every five or six years. Since 1983, the censuses have included
questions about the existence of court orders on a variety of (specified) topics. The resulting data are
the most comprehensive information available, although the data include demonstrable and important
omissions. For example, there has been a court order involving mental health care at every California
prison since 1997, and another involving medical care since 2002. For information on the mental
health orders, see Coleman v. Brown, No. 2:90-cv-00520 (E.D. Cal.), CIVIL RIGHTS LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearnghouse.net/detail.php?id=573 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). For
information on the medical decree, see Plata v. Brown, No. 3:01-cv-01351 (N.D. Cal.), CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=589 (last visited Nov. 1,
2014); Order Adopting Class Action Stipulation as Fair, Reasonable and Adequate, Plata v. Davis, No.
3:01-cv-01351 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 2002), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PC-CA-
0018-0001.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014); and the underlying Stipulation for Injunctive Relief, Plata v.
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Table 8: Incidence of Court Orders, Local Jails and
State Prisons, 1983-200644
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Total Facilities Total Population Housed in
Year Facilities with Orders Population Facilities with Orders
1983 3,338 18% 227,541 51%
1988 3,316 18% 336,017 50%
Jails 1993 3,268 18% 466,155 46%
1999 3,365 17% 607,978 32%
2006 3,282 11% 756,839 20%
1984 694 27% 377,036 43%
State 1990 957 28% 617,859 
36%
Prisons 1995 1,084 32% 879,766 40%
2000 1,042 28% 1,042,637 40%
2005 1,067 18% 1,096,755 22%
Columns (a) and (c) show the total number of facilities, and total
incarcerated population, for jails and prisons in each census year. Columns (b) and
(d) ten show the proportion of those totals in which the census responses report
court orders. Looking at columns (b) and (d) in the censuses most immediately
following the PLRA-1999 for jails and 2000 for prisons-suggests only a very
limited impact of the statute. (This is what I reported in 2006, before data from
the next iteration of the census became available.) The next census administration
is the one where the PLRA's impact is much more marked: the decline in covered
facilities (column (b)) is very large, and the decline in covered population (column
(d)) even more so.
And finally, Table 9 emphasizes the new rarity of system-wide court order
coverage. The table's first row lists, by census year, how many states report one or
more facilities subject to court order. That number remains substantial. But the
second row shows states in which sixty percent or more of the facilities or
population are covered by court order-and that row demonstrates that where
this kind of system-wide (or close to it) coverage used to be quite common, it is
now rare. In 2005 and 2006, respectively, only five states reported system-wide
court order coverage of their prisons, and only two states of their jails.
45
Davis, No. 3:01-cv-01351 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2002), http://www.clearmghouse.net/chDocs/public/
PC-CA-0018-0005.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). Yet no California prison reported azy court order m
the Census responses m 2005. So the data m Table 7 should be taken as indicative of trends, rather
than dispositive about any given state or facility.
44. See infra Technical App. at F-G.
45. I define "system-wide" as reaching sixty percent or more facilities or population in a state,
in a given census administration, after private and community-corrections facilities are excluded.
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Table 9: System-Wide Court Order Coverage, by State 46
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Local jails (n = 47) State Prisons (n = 51)
1983 1988 1993 1999 2006 1984 1990 1995 2000 2005
States w/ Any 44 46 43 43 39 43 44 41 30 25
Court Orders
States w/ System- 8 8 9 3 2 11 14 16 12 5
Wide Orders*
System-Wide Court Order Coverage
Alaska S S S S
Ariz. 0 S S S S S
Ark. S




D.C. 0 S S S S S S S





La. S S S S S S
Minn. S
MiSS. S S S S
Mont. S S
N.H. 0 S S
N.J. 0 0
N.M. 0 S S







Tenn. S S S S
Tex. S S S S S
Utah S S
W. Va. S S
* States in which the proportion of the states' non-private, non-community
corrections facilities reporting court orders, or the proportion of incarcerated
population in those facilities, is greater than sixty percent.
46. See zfra Technical App. at F-G.
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The point is not that courts are no longer part of the prison and jail
oversight ecosystem. In California (of all states) the contrary is obvious-
numerous injunctive cases have transformed California's criminal justice system,
47
and more changes are underway. 48 But the PLRA has made such cases far more
rare.
CONCLUSION
In my view, court cases and court-enforceable regulation have since the
1970s been useful correctives to dysfunctions and abuses that frequently occur in
our low-visibility jails and prisons. But the practice of prisoner litigation is
susceptible to criticism, from the left, that prisoner access to courts offers the
appearance but not the reality of justice, 49 and that court orders have both
"contributed to mass incarceration," by promoting the building of new prisons to
reduce overcrowding,5 0 and limited prisoner freedom by enhancing prison
bureaucracy.5' Simultaneously, the critics from the right who got the PLRA passed
suggested that prisoner cases are usually frivolous and prison and jail decrees
frequently overreaching.5 2 This debate is far beyond the scope of this Article-but
perhaps further research will be spurred by publication of these statistics, which
demonstrate the kind of variance, over time and location, that researchers might
use to shed additional light on how prisoner litigation actually functions.
Whichever view is correct, the statistics set out below pose an enormous challenge
to us as a polity. Litigation has receded as an oversight method in American
corrections. It is vital that something take its place.
47. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011); Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and
Realignmet Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165 (2013).
48. For a description of the Plata litigation's recent progress, see Plata v. Brown, 3:01-cv-
01351 (N.D. Cal.), CIVIL RIGHTS LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearnghouse.net/detail.php
?id=589 (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). For descriptions of other ongoing litigated interventions into
California's criminal justice system, see, for example, Ashker v. Brown, 4:09-cv-05796-CW (N.D.
Cal.), CIVIL RIGHTS LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12103
(last visited Nov. 1, 2014); Gray v. County of Riverside, 5:13-cv-00444 (C.D. Cal.), CIVIL RIGHTS
LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.clearnghouse.net/detail.php?id=12729 (last visited Nov. 1,
2014).
49. Cf, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIECLE) (1997)
(presenting and analyzing this critique more broadly).
50. Heather Schoenfeld, Mass Incarceration and the Paradox of Prison Conudkions Ligation, 44 LAW
& SOC'Y REV. 731, 760 (2010).
51. Malcolm M. Feeley & Van Swearingen, The Pson Conc tions Cases and the B,reawratization of
American Corrections: Influences, Impacts and Imp lications, 24 PACE L. REV. 433, 466-75 (2004).
52. See, e.g., ROss SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003); Dennis C. Vacco et al., Letter to the Editor,
Free the Courtsfrom Frivolous Prisoner Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at A26 (letter from Attorneys
General of New York, Nevada, Indiana, and Washington).
2015]
UC IRTVINE LAW REVIEW[
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
I have posted a compiled file containing state -by-state-by-year data:
* Jail population
* State prison population
* Federal prison population
* Federal court prisoner filings (by type of federal /non-federal
defendant)
This full panel dataset is available at https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/
margoschlanger/Pages/Trends.aspx, and was used to produce Tables 1-2, and
Figures A E. This printed Technical Appendix includes more information about
the sources that underlie that posted dataset, and also the data used for the
remaining tables and figures.
Both federal and state prison populations are year-end counts, and are
available for all years for all states. Jail population is entirely unavailable for 1971-
1977 and 1979, and only national data are available for 1980-1982, 1984-1987,
1991-1992, and 1994-1999. Where available, the figure chosen is the average daily
population (because that is the most consistently available data for state-by-state
data). But for a few years when average daily population is not available, the mid-
year count is used instead. Details are included in the data file itself
A. Federal Court Filings, Outcomes, and Other
Characteristics (Tabes 1-6, Figures A-E)
Case filing, termination, and outcome figures in Tables 1-6 are derived from
data by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (the AO) and cleaned up by
the Federal Judicial Center, the research arm of the federal court system. These
data include each and every case "terminated" (that is, ended, at least
provisionally) by the federal district courts since 1970. The Federal Judicial Center
also publishes periodic reports on the data. My figures are not from these written
reports, but are instead based on my compilation and manipulation of the raw data
to eliminate duplicates, remands, etc. The Federal Judicial Center lodges this
database for public access with the Inter-university Consortium for Political and
Social Research (ICPSR), which maintains it at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. I
used the following datasets, pulling the "civil terminations" data from each.
Unfortunately, I am unable to post actual data because the Bureau of Justice
Statistics has instructed the ICPSR that the data be available only for restricted
use. (By "prisoner civil rights" I mean cases with a "nature of suit" code equal to
either 550 (prisoner civil rights) or 555 (prison conditions). I discern no clear
distinction between these two codes.) A consolidated codebook for the resulting
consolidated database is posted at https://www.law.umich.edu/facultyhome/
[Vol. 5:153
TRENDS IN PRISONER LITIGATION
margoschlanger/Pages /Trends.aspx. It includes more details, such as the nature
of suit codes used for the categories in Tables 3, 4, and 6.
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
1970-2000, ICPSR STUDY NO. 8429 (last updated Apr. 25, 2002).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
2001, ICPSR STUDY NO. 3415 (last updated June 19, 2002).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
2002, ICPSR STUDY NO. 4059 (last updated Oct. 8, 2004).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
2003, ICPSR STUDY NO. 4026 (last updated June 17, 2004).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
2004, ICPSR STUDYNO. 4348 (last updated Nov. 4, 2005).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
2005, ICPSR STUDY NO. 4382 (last updated Mar. 17, 2006).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
2006, ICPSR STUDY NO. 4685 (last updated Mar. 15, 2007).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
2007, ICPSR STUDY NO. 22,300 (last updated June 18, 2008).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
2008, ICPSR STUDY NO. 25,002 (last updated June 29, 2009).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
2009, ICPSR STUDYNO. 29,661 (last updated Nov. 26, 2012).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
2010, ICPSR Study No. 30,401 (last updated Nov. 26, 2012).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
2011, ICPSR STUDY NO. 33,622 (last updated Jan. 8, 2013).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
2012, ICPSR STUDY NO. 34,881 (last updated Mar. 18, 2014).
* FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE,
APPELLATE AND CIVIL PENDING DATA, 2012, ICPSR 29,281 (last
updated Mar. 19, 2014) (I used these data for pending civil cases).
B. Case Outcomes and Damages (Table 7)
Table 7 began using information in the AO data described above, in the
terminations data for Fiscal Year 2012. I made two lists of prisoner civil rights
cases in that dataset. For the first column in the table, I took the thirty-six cases in
which the disposition code indicated a trial judgment in plaintiff's favor (disp = 7,
8, or 9, and judgefor = 1 or 3). The second column includes other, non-trial, cases
in which judgment was listed as in plaintiffs favor (judgefor = 1 or 3). For each
case on either list, I examined the docket, available via the federal court's Public
Access to Court Electronic Records system, and relevant court documents to
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determine both whether the AO-coded outcome was correct and the actual
damages awarded, if any. I was able to find all but one of the cases. Table 7
includes only cases in which the outcome was in fact a litigated plaintiffs'
judgment, omitting many cases in which defendants won or the outcome was a
settlement. I list the actual damages, which frequently differ from the AO-coded
damages.
C. State Prison Population (Tables 1 & 2, Figures A-E)
1970: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions: 1968 1970, NAT'L PRISONER STAT.
BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, D.C.), Apr. 1972, at 22, tbl. 10c (sentenced
prisoners).
1971 to 1973: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1974, NAT'L
PRISONER STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, D.C.),June 1976, at 14, tbl. 1
(mostly sentenced prisoners).
1974: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1974, NAT'L PRISONER
STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, D.C.), June 1976, App. II, at 36, tbl. 1
(all prisoners).
1975: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1975, NAT'L PRISONER
STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of justice, D.C.) Feb. 1977, App. II, at 36, tbl. 1 (all
prisoners).
1976: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1977, NAT'L PRISONER
STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, D.C.) Feb. 1979, at 10, tbl. 1 (all
prisoners).
1977: Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1978, NAT'L PRISONER
STAT. BULL. (U.S. Dep't of Justice, D.C.) May 1980, at 42, special tbl. (all
prisoners, in custody).
1978 to 2012: Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool (CSAT) Prisoners, U.S. DEP'T
JUST., BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfmty=nps (follow
"Quick Tables" hyperlink; then view "Inmates in custody of state or federal
correctional facilities, excluding private prison facilities, December 31,
1978-2013," and "Inmates in custody of state or federal correctional
facilities, including private prison facilities, December 31, 1999-2012";
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D. Federal Pison Population (Tables I & 2, Figures A-E)
1. National Population Ony (Tables I & 2, Figures A-E)
For national federal prison population, the sources are the same as for state
prison population, Part C, supra.
2. State-by-State Population (Table 2, Figures C-E)
Federal prison state-by-state population is not average daily population; the
data are for prisoner counts, usually for the end of September. Full details
available with the dataset itself






1994 to 2012: BOP Inmate Population by Institution (includes privately managed
institutions, but not community corrections). Federal Bureau of Prisons
spreadsheet provided June 13, 2014, by Jennifer Batchelder, Supervisory
Research Analyst, Office of Research and Evaluation, Federal Bureau of
Prisons, on file with author.
E. Jail Population (Tables 1-2, Figures A-E)
Note: No data available for 1971 to 1977 and 1979. I assumed a jail
population of 160,000 for 1971 to 1977, based on the figures in 1970 and 1978. I
assumed a jail population of 170,000 in 1979, based on the figures in 1978.
1. National Population Onl
1980 to 2000: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002), predousy
available at http: //www.ojp.usdoj.gov /bjs /glance /sheets /corr2.wkl (on file
with author) (June 30 count for jails, Dec. 31 count for prisons, and Jan. 1
count for paroles).
1980 to 1994: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1994, at 5 (June
1996, NCJ 160091), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
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cpius94a.pdf; see also http: //www.bjs.gov /content/pub /sheets /cpi94a.zip
(June 30 count).
1990 to 1996: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1996, at 20 (Apr.
1999, NCJ 170013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cpius96.pdf (June 30 count for all, and average daily population 1990-
1993).
1997 to 1999: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON
AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2000, at 6, available at http://www.bjs
.gov/content/pub/pdf/pjim00.pdf (June 30 count).
2000 to 2013: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JAIL
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2013-STATISTICAL TABLES at tbl.1 (May 2014,
NCJ 245350), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jiml3st
.pdf (June 30 count and average daily population).
2. State-b;-State Population
1970: Mid-year jail population. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, NATIONALJAIL CENSUS 1970, at 10 tbl.2 (1971) (March
count).
1978, 1983, 1988, and 1993: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, JAIL INMATES, By SEX, HELD IN LOCAL JAILS (1997), previousy
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/data/corpop09.wkl (on file with
author) (June 30 count); see aAo Jail Censuses for those years (June 30 count
and average daily population); BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, THE 1983 JAIL CENSUS, at 2 (Nov. 1984, NCJ 95536); Part F.,
infra.
1983: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1985, at 5 (Dec. 1987, NCJ-
103957), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus85.pdf
(June 30 count).
1989: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989, at 5, 8 (Oct. 1991, NCJ-
130445), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus89.pdf
(June 30 count).
1990: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990, at 5 (July 1992, NCJ-
134946), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus90.pdf
(June 29 count).
1993: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993, at 7 (October 1995, NCJ-
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156241), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpop93bk.pdf
(Dec. 31 count).
1994 to 1999: Because state-by-state jail population is not available from 1994 to
1999, jail population for those years is calculated using a linear interpolation
between the 1993 and 2000 figures for each state.
2000 to 2012: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
MORTALITY IN LOCAL JAILS AND STATE PRISONS, 2000-2012-Statistical
Tables, at 15 tbl. 11 (Oct. 2014, NCJ 247448), available at http://www.bjs
.gov/content/pub/pdf/mljspoo12st.pdf; see also http://www.bjs.gov/index
.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5115 (average daily population). Note: the figures
for Tennessee and Oklahoma are adjusted in 2010, 2011, and 2012, and for
New York in 2012, because Davidson County, Oklahoma City, and Erie
County were omitted from published data in those years. Thanks to Daniela
Golinelli, Chief, Corrections Unit, Bureau of Justice Statistics, for providing
appropriate corrections.
F. Pison Censuses (Tables 8 & 9)
1984: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF
STATE ADULT CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1984, ICPSR STUDY No. 8444
(last updated Apr. 22, 1997); see also http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/csacf84.pdf.
1990: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF
STATE AND FEDERAL ADULT CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1990, ICPSR
STUDY NO. 9908 (last updated Dec. 21, 2001); see also http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/csfcf90.pdf.
1995: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF
STATE AND FEDERAL ADULT CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 1995, ICPSR
STUDY NO. 6953 (last updated Apr. 20, 1998); see also http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/Csfcf95.pdf.
2000: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF
STATE AND FEDERAL ADULT CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2000, ICPSR
STUDY NO. 4021 (last updated July 9, 2004); see also http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/csfcf00.pdf.
2005: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF
STATE AND FEDERAL ADULT CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2005, ICPSR
STUDY NO. 24,642 (last updated Oct. 5, 2010); see also http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/csfcf05.pdf.
G. Jail Censuses (Tables 8 & 9)
1983: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL JAIL
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1988: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL JAIL
CENSUS, 1988, ICPSR STUDY NO. 9256 (last updated June 24, 1997); see aso
http: //www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/clj88-voll.pdf, http://www.bjs
.gov/content/pub/pdf/clj88.pdf.
1993: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL JAIL
CENSUS, 1993, ICPSR STUDY NO. 6648 (last updated July 13, 1996).
1999: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL JAIL
CENSUS, 1999, ICPSR STUDY NO. 3318 (last updated Aug. 16, 2002); see aso
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cj99.pdf.
2006: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF JAIL
FACILITIES, 2006 ICPSR STUDY NO. 26,602 (last updated Jan. 6, 2010); see
aso http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cjf06.pdf.
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